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Abstract 
We examine how the technological aspect of competition (or technological peer pressure) affects 
the likelihood that auditors issue going-concern opinions. We find that a client firm’s technological 
peer pressure increases the likelihood that the firm receives a going-concern opinion. This finding 
is consistent with the notion that perceived auditor business risk increases with client technological 
peer pressure so that auditors are more likely to issue going-concern opinions to clients with such 
pressure. Further evidence shows that this positive effect is more pronounced for client firms with 
greater innovation originality, that are financially constrained, and for auditors facing higher 
litigation risk. We also find that technological peer pressure reduces the probability of both Type 
I and Type II misclassifications when auditors exert more effort. Additional analyses show that 
client firms’ technological peer pressure positively affects the likelihood of using auditors 
specialized in auditing R&D. Taken together, our study implies that auditors exert more effort to 
increase audit quality in response to the higher auditor business risk induced by clients’ 
technological peer pressure, instead of simply being conservative.   
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1. Introduction 
The study examines the effect of a client firm’s technological competition on the likelihood 
of receiving a going-concern opinion and on opinion accuracy. There is an extensive literature on 
the determinants of going-concern opinions, including financial ratios, market performance, 
corporate governance, legal environment, auditor characteristics and incentives, as well as 
managerial incentives (e.g., Carcello and Neal 2000; DeFond et al. 2002; Chen et al. 2013; DeFond 
and Zhang 2014). This study focuses on the competitive environment that a client confronts for 
the following two reasons. First, auditing standards require that auditors understand the 
competitive environment of a client firm when identifying risks of material misstatements and 
assessing the client’s going-concern assumption (PCAOB AS 2110; AU-C Section 315).1 Second, 
prior studies show that competition (such as product market competition) increases client business 
risk, and as a result, increases auditor business risk (Wang and Chui 2015). Auditors respond to 
higher business risk by increasing audit fees (Bell et al. 2001) and issuing more going-concern 
opinions (DeFond et al. 2016).  
Both auditing standards and auditing literature suggest that a client’s competition affects 
an auditor’s risk assessment and decision-making regarding going-concern opinions. However, 
there is limited research directly examining how an auditor perceives and responds to the client’s 
competitive environment, particularly from the dimension of technology, in the process of going-
concern reporting. Such a question is important and worthy of investigation for two reasons. First, 
firms facing technological competition, or peer pressure, usually hold a large amount of intangible 
assets and R&D investments. Intangibles, especially those that are internally developed, pose 
                                                          
1 Specifically, PCAOB AS 2110 states that auditors should understand relevant industry factors of the company, 
including the competitive environment and technological developments. Similarly, AU-C Section 315 states that 
auditors may consider the market and competition, such as price competition, as well as product technology as 
examples of industry conditions of a client entity.  
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greater challenges in valuation and assessment of future cash flows, relative to tangible assets. 
Auditors are granted access to private information on clients’ technologies in the process of 
auditing (Krishnan and Wang 2014), therefore, auditors’ perceptions of clients’ technological 
competitive environments are relevant. Second, prior studies show that auditor conservatism has 
a real effect on corporate innovation (e.g., Chy and Hope 2018). Thus, understanding how auditors 
respond to clients’ technological competition, i.e., exerting more effort or being more conservative, 
provides insights on clients’ operations.  
Competition is multi-dimensional. Cao et al. (2018) refer to technological competition as 
“the extent to which a firm invests in technology that will be used to develop or improve its 
products” (on p. 2). As they point out, technological competition is one fundamental dimension of 
the more broadly defined product market competition. In a knowledge-based economy, whether a 
business entity can survive in a technologically competitive environment is vital to its survival and 
success (Eisdorfer and Hsu 2011; Cao et al. 2018). An auditor might perceive the technological 
competition and peer pressure of its client as rivalry threats that lead to increased client/auditor 
business risks and increased likelihood of business failure, or as opportunities to advance 
technologies and strengthen competitive competencies that lead to increased likelihood of future 
profitability.  
When facing intensive technological competition, a firm could develop its own cutting-
edge technologies or choose to be a fast follower by acquiring technologies from inventors or 
imitating innovations of competitors (Yung 2016). Both involve greater client business risk that 
threatens its existence on a going-concern basis. First, an innovation program is risky and its 
outcome is uncertain. Failure in innovation hurts a firm’s profit and future competitive advantage, 
and ultimately can lead to business failure (Eisdorfer and Hsu 2011). In addition, technology-
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related risks, such as cybersecurity and privacy threats, might adversely affect a firm’s financial 
position and revenue growth (PwC 2018). Second, if a firm chooses to be a follower, there could 
be an adverse selection discount that hurts firm valuation and increases the difficulty of obtaining 
external financing (Yung 2016). Third, when imitating innovation of competitors, a firm might 
encounter lawsuits for technology infringement and end up with an unfavorable court decision and 
high litigation cost, making the firm subject to higher risk of bankruptcy (Eisdorfer and Hsu 2011).  
A client’s business risk, induced by intensified technological competition, can transfer into 
higher audit risk (e.g., O’Keefe et al. 1994; Johnstone 2000). In response to the higher auditor 
business risk, auditors might be “lowering the threshold for issuing a going concern opinion” 
(DeFond et al. 2016, p. 70) or increasing audit effort to improve audit quality (Bell et al. 2001; 
Venkataraman et al. 2008; Blankley et al. 2012). Thus, if auditors perceive rivalry threats and 
increased client/auditor business risks from clients’ technological competition, they are more 
likely to issue going-concern opinions. 
On the contrary, auditors might perceive clients’ technological competition or peer 
pressure as an opportunity to use technologies to develop and improve products that decrease the 
likelihood of business failure. Prior studies show that technological competition generates 
knowledge spillovers, which could increase the marginal productivity of innovation outputs (Qiu 
and Wan 2015). It also reflects the extent to which a firm explores technology fields with heated 
inventive activity (Li et al. 2018). Firms tend to accumulate financial resources, e.g., increasing 
cash holding, to take advantage of the spillover effects of technological competition (Qiu and Wan 
2015) or form strategic alliances to explore ‘hot’ technologies in the economy (Li et al. 2018), 
which might improve a firm’s liquidity and reduce bankruptcy risk. Further, firms in a 
technologically competitive environment have incentives to avoid a going-concern opinion 
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because of ensuing adverse consequences, including preventing them from innovating or acquiring 
outside technologies. Lastly, an auditor might not fully understand its client’s technological 
competition because innovation-related information is non-salient and difficult to process 
(Hirshleifer et al. 2013), and may not coincide with economic value (Kogan et al. 2017). Thus, 
there might be a positive or indirect association between technological competition and the 
likelihood of going-concern opinions. 
We examine these competing predictions using a panel of data during the period from 2000 
to 2010. We use the measure of technological peer pressure (TPP) following Cao et al. (2018). 
TPP is a firm’s technological peer pressure, constructed by comparing the aggregate R&D stock 
from its all peers to its own R&D stock. Modified from the variable in Bloom et al. (2013), TPP 
captures both technological rivalry threats and technology spillovers by relating a firm’s own 
technological investments to the technological developments of the economy. We first find that a 
client’s technological peer pressure positively affects the likelihood of receiving a going-concern 
opinion, consistent with the prediction that intensified technological competition, or peer pressure, 
increases perceived client and auditor business risks. Further, we show that the effect of 
technological peer pressure is economically significant. One standard deviation increase in our 
measure of technological peer pressure leads to an approximately 11.4% increase in the likelihood 
of going-concern opinions.  
We perform three cross-sectional analyses. First, we find that the positive relation between 
technological peer pressure and the likelihood of going-concern opinions is caused by new and 
original technologies, measured as in Hirshleifer et al. (2018), because it is more difficult and 
challenging for auditors to understand and evaluate the information on original technologies. 
Second, the positive relation between technological peer pressure and the likelihood of going-
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concern opinions are more pronounced for clients with financial constraints (Hadlock and Pierce 
2010), supporting the arguments that financially constrained firms are not able to finance their 
R&D projects continuously (Li 2011) or quickly absorb technology spillovers (Qiu and Wan 2015), 
which decreases profitability and increases the probability of business failure. Third, we find a 
stronger effect for auditors with higher litigation risk (Hennes et al. 2008; Kim and Skinner 2012; 
Chen et al. 2013).  
We also examine the impact of technological peer pressure on the going-concern reporting 
accuracy. Technological peer pressure could lower the accuracy of going-concern issuance by 
increasing the uncertainty of the financial viability of clients, which makes it more challenging for 
auditors to evaluate a firm’s going-concern assumption. In contrast, technological peer pressure 
may also motivate auditors to assess firms’ going-concern assumption more accurately. Firms 
facing technological peer pressure demand high audit quality. Moreover, auditors might anticipate 
an increased probability of opinion errors and increased engagement risk from clients’ 
technological competition. Thus, they are more likely to increase effort or use specialists’ work 
(Griffith 2018) to more accurately evaluate a firm’s going-concern assumption.  
We find that although technological peer pressure increases the probability of Type I 
misclassification in general, auditors who exert more audit effort could reduce both Type I and 
Type II errors for clients with intensified technological peer pressure. In addition, we find that 
technological peer pressure positively affects the likelihood of using auditors specialized in 
auditing R&D. These results indicate that auditors respond to clients’ technological peer pressure 
by exerting more effort and applying specialized knowledge to increase the reporting accuracy of 
going-concern opinions.   
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Our study contributes to the prior literature in two primary ways. First, we contribute to 
the research on the determinants of going-concern audit opinions by examining one factor 
unexplored by the prior studies, that is, technological competition faced by clients. Auditing 
standards state that auditors should understand the competition and technological developments 
when assessing risks of material misstatements and a client’s going-concern assumption (PCAOB 
AS 2110; AU-C Section 315). However, there is no evidence for how a client’s competitive 
environment affects auditors’ going-concern reporting. Our study introduces a new angle of 
competition, technological peer pressure, into auditing research and directly examines the effect 
of clients’ technological peer pressure on the likelihood of going-concern opinions, as well as 
opinion accuracy. Our study suggests that investors or other interested parties could use this firm-
specific technology-based competition measure to infer client and auditor business risks.  
Second, our study contributes to the research on the consequences of technological 
competition. There has been a fair amount of finance and management literature examining the 
impact of technological competition on corporate financing and strategies (e.g., Qiu and Wan 2015; 
Qiu et al. 2017; Li et al. 2018), however, there is scant research exploring technological 
competition in accounting and auditing literature. 2  Our research provides evidence on how 
technological competition affects auditors’ decision-making process regarding going-concern 
opinions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature 
and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection and research variables. Section 
4 discusses the empirical results. We conclude in Section 5.  
                                                          
2 Two recent studies examine the relation between technological competition and corporate disclosure. Cao et al. 
(2018) find an overall negative association between technological peer pressure and product disclosure. Ettredge et 
al. (2018) find that technology spillover is associated with the choices of disclosure in annual reports. Cao et al. (2018) 
find an overall negative association between technological peer pressure and product disclosure.  
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2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Extant literature has documented many client characteristics that are associated with the 
issuance of going-concern opinions (e.g., Carson et al. 2013; DeFond and Zhang 2014). These 
characteristics range from financial statement items, such as debt defaults (e.g., Carcello et al. 
1995; Raghunandan and Rama 1995; Carcello and Neal 2000; Behn et al. 2001; Geiger and 
Raghunandan 2001; Geiger et al. 2005; Lee et al. 2005; Bruynseels and Willekens 2012) to non-
financial statement factors, for instance, market returns and stock return volatility (e.g., DeFond et 
al. 2002; Kausar and Lennox 2011), mitigating factors (Behn et al. 2001), corporate governance 
(Carcello and Neal 2000), institutional and legal environment (Geiger et al. 2006), etc. Recent 
studies provide evidence that managerial-level attributes also affect the likelihood of going-
concern audit opinions, such as managerial ability (e.g., Krishnan and Wang 2015) and managerial 
incentives (e.g., Chen et al. 2013). One determinant missing from this line of research is the 
technologically competitive environment faced by clients and perceived by auditors. 
The competitive environment of a firm significantly influences its strategies and future 
performance. In response to competition, firms lower prices or differentiate their products to gain 
market share. From the stock market perspective, competition increases stock return volatility of 
a firm because it increases the uncertainty of the firm’s fundamental future cash flows (Irvine and 
Pontiff 2009). The product market competition also affects auditing. Wang and Chui (2015) 
examine the relation between product market competition and audit fees. They find that the 
increased client business risk, induced by product market competition, transfers to higher auditor 
business risk, leading to higher audit pricing.  
8 
 
In a knowledge-based economy, technology “underpins innovation in all forms” (PwC 
2018, p. 5) and is the main driver of firm value in the long run. Firms could significantly reduce 
production costs by applying better production technologies, leading to lower prices. Further, firms 
could develop new products, or add new features to existing products, by applying innovative 
product technologies to differentiate themselves from competitors. Firms could also enter a new 
market or industry with innovative technologies.3 Thus, succeeding in technological competition 
is critical to a firm’s survival, growth and profitability (Cao et al. 2018).  
Given the importance of a firm’s competitive environment to its survival and profitability, 
the auditing standards require that auditors understand the competitive environment of a client firm 
(PCAOB AS 2110; AU-C Section 315). An auditor might perceive its client’s technological 
competition or peer pressure as threats to the survival of its client, which leads to increased client 
and auditor business risks.  
A firm has two options in response to the intensified technological competition and peer 
pressure. The first option is to develop a firm’s own cutting-edge technologies. This option 
requires long-term commitment, countless experiments and sizable and risky investments in 
capital and labor, which requires significant financial resources. If a firm fails to develop new 
technologies or cannot transfer the R&D investment into profitability, the firm’s financial status 
could significantly deteriorate.4 To support its R&D, a firm might cut operating expenses, or forgo 
other profitable projects, which further decreases the imminent profitability. If the firm finances 
innovation by debt contracts, default risk could increase, resulting in potential business failure. 
                                                          
3 For example, in a recent study on artificial intelligence (AI), “PwC projects that AI will add US$15.7 trillion to 
global GDP by 2030 as a result of efficiencies and higher customer values” (PwC 2018, p. 5). 
4 Gu (2016) shows that a R&D project is more likely to fail with more competition, therefore, R&D intensive firms 
are riskier in competitive industries. 
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Technology-related risks, such as cybersecurity or privacy threats, could also harm a business 
(PwC 2018).  
The second option is to be a fast follower by acquiring technologies from inventors or 
imitating innovations of competitors (Yung 2016). Firms that choose to be a follower bear a “cost 
of delay.” Yung (2016) shows that external financing reduces the incentive to be a follower and 
encourages innovation, therefore, firms that choose to be followers are considered to be less able 
firms with lower valuations, and have difficulties financing externally, which might deteriorate the 
firm’s financial status. In addition, when imitating innovation of competitors, a firm might 
encounter lawsuits for infringement, and an unfavorable court decision and high litigation costs 
could lead to bankruptcy. Eisdorfer and Hsu (2011) provide evidence that technological 
competition increases the probability of bankruptcy. To summarize, intensified technological 
competition or peer pressure increases client business risk and could negatively impact a client 
firm’s financial status, increasing the probability of future business failure. 
Prior auditing literature suggests that higher client business risk is associated with higher 
auditor business risk (e.g., O’Keefe et al. 1994; Johnstone 2000). Auditors tend to charge higher 
audit fees (e.g., Morgan and Stocken 1998; Bell et al. 2001), resign from the audit engagements 
(e.g., Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Shu 2000), or issue going-concern opinions for clients with 
higher business risk, to reduce potential litigation costs. For example, DeFond et al. (2016, p. 70) 
assert that “another strategy for mitigating risk is lowering the threshold for issuing a going 
concern opinion.” They find that the engagement risk is lower for conservative clients, leading to 
less likelihood of going-concern opinions. Kaplan and Williams (2013) provide evidence that 
issuing going-concern reports for financially distressed clients protects auditors from lawsuits. In 
addition, auditors could also increase effort to improve audit quality when they assess higher 
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business risk (Bell et al. 2001; Venkataraman et al. 2008; Blankley et al. 2012). Following this line 
of reasoning, if an auditor perceives its client’s technological peer pressure as increasing client and 
auditor business risks, it is more likely to issue a going-concern audit opinion.  
Alternatively, an auditor might perceive its client’s technological competition or peer 
pressure as an opportunity to use technologies to develop and improve products, which leads to 
future profitability. Furthermore, firms are likely to accumulate financial resources or take 
strategies to obtain financing to prepare for the technological competition. For example, Qiu and 
Wan (2015) show a knowledge spillover effect of technological competition that could increase 
the marginal productivity of innovation inputs of peer firms. They show that firms increase cash 
holding in response to technological competition for the funding needed to acquire outside 
technologies or develop their own innovations. Li et al. (2018) find that firms which are chasing 
technologies with heated inventive activity (or technology conglomerates) are more likely to form 
strategic alliances which facilitate knowledge pooling and cross-fertilization.  
Increasing cash holdings could improve a firm’s liquidity and financial position, which 
increases the ability that a firm continues its operations on a going-concern basis. Forming strategic 
alliances helps to attract investors and obtain financing, which decreases bankruptcy risk 
(Demirkan and Zhou 2016). If an auditor perceives technological competition or peer pressure as 
an opportunity for technological development and its client is well-prepared financially, the auditor 
is less likely to issue a going-concern opinion. Furthermore, researchers present evidence on the 
negative consequences of going-concern opinions, such as negative market reaction (e.g., Menon 
and Williams 2010) and increased cost of equity and debt (e.g., Amin et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2016). 
These consequences might negatively affect a firm obtaining resources required to compete for 
technologies, therefore, managers have greater incentives to pressure auditors for clean opinions.  
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It is also likely that an auditor is unable to fully consider its client’s technological 
competition because it is difficult to process non-salient technology-related information or predict 
the economic value of innovation output. The scientific value of innovation output may not 
coincide with the economic value. For example, a minor technology advancement may generate 
significant economic value as long as it restricts competition from rival firms (Kogan et al. 2017). 
Thus, audit opinions do not systematically reflect clients’ technological competition or peer 
pressure. We state our first hypothesis in a null form as follows: 
H1: Technological peer pressure is not associated with the likelihood that a firm receives a 
going-concern audit opinion. 
Literature on the going-concern reporting accuracy shows that there are two types of 
misclassification of going-concern opinions.5 Prior studies document high rates of both types of 
misclassification. For example, Carson et al. (2013) summarize that in the United States, the 
percentage of firms receiving a going-concern opinion, but do not file for bankruptcy, is around 
80 to 90 percent (Type I) while around 40 to 50 percent of bankrupt firms did not receive a going-
concern opinion (Type II).  
Auditors incur costs of losing clients, that are associated with the Type I misclassification, 
and litigation costs or reputation loss, that are associated with the Type II misclassification. The 
trade-off of these two costs partially explains the high rates of reporting errors of going-concern 
opinions (Carson et al. 2013). In addition to the auditors’ incentives, lack of expertise could also 
result in lower reporting accuracy of going-concern opinions (e.g., Arnold et al. 2001).6  
                                                          
5 Type I misclassification refers to a situation of issuing a going-concern opinion to a firm which is viable and Type 
II misclassification refers to a situation of not issuing a going-concern opinion to a firm which subsequently fails. Chy 
and Hope (2018) point out that Type I misclassification captures auditor conservatism and Type II misclassification 
captures auditor aggressiveness. 
6 Studies also show that there are technical and allocative inefficiencies of audit firm staffing (Chang et al. 2018), 
which might lead to lower audit quality.  
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Technological competition or peer pressure increases the likelihood of a client’s business 
failure, leading to higher auditor business risk. If auditors behave more conservatively by lowering 
the threshold of issuing a going-concern opinion, we expect to observe an increase in Type I 
misclassification. In the meantime, technological competition increases the uncertainty of financial 
viability of clients, which makes it more challenging for auditors to evaluate a client firm’s going-
concern assumption. Therefore, it is possible that auditors make more errors in going-concern 
reporting.  
On the contrary, auditors might improve reporting accuracy of going-concern opinions for 
clients facing fierce technological competition. First, clients facing fierce technological 
competition demand high audit quality and going-concern reporting accuracy. Prior studies show 
that conservative auditors could impede corporate innovation (Chy and Hope 2018), which is 
undesirable for clients that would like to succeed in a technological competition. Thus, auditors 
could not attract such clients if they simply behave conservatively by issuing more going-concern 
opinions. Second, clients’ technological competition might indicate an increase in client/auditor 
business risk (or engagement risk). Studies on auditor judgement show that when the perceived 
engagement risk increases, auditors are more likely to include relational cues from specialists’ 
work which improve their judgments and decisions (Griffith 2018). Third, clients facing 
technological competition usually invest more in R&D. When firms have high levels of R&D 
investments, it is difficult for auditors to evaluate R&D activities reliably and accurately (Godfrey 
and Hamilton 2005). Therefore, auditors might anticipate the increased probability of reporting 
errors, of going-concern opinions, at the planning stage.   
To reduce the opinion errors, auditors could include specialized knowledge or expertise, 
allocate more resources in the audit engagements, expand audit scope, and increase sampling and 
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testing to more accurately evaluate clients’ going-concern assumptions. For example, Godfrey and 
Hamilton (2005) find a positive relation between R&D intensity and auditor’s specialization in 
auditing R&D activities. In other words, auditors exert more effort to increase reporting accuracy 
of going-concern opinions. If this is the case, we could observe a decrease in both Type I and Type 
II misclassification rates if auditors exert more effort when auditing clients with intensified 
technological competition. Our second hypothesis is stated in the null form as follows: 
H2: Technological peer pressure is not associated with the accuracy of auditors’ going-
concern opinions.  
 
3. Data and research variables  
Measuring technological peer pressure 
We measure firm technological peer pressure (TPP) by following the procedure in Cao et 
al. (2018). TPP is modified from the technology spillover measure proposed by Bloom et al. (2013), 
but better captures the technological threats from peer firms. To calculate the measure, we first 
follow Bloom et al. (2013) and calculate the technological similarity between firms in their patent 
distributions across the 438 three-digit technology classes defined by the US Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO). We first assign to each firm a technology distribution vector Vi based on its patent 
distribution across 438 three-digit technology classes. Vi = {s1, s2,…, s438}, where s1 is the 
proportion of patents held by firm i in technology class 1 during the past five years (i.e., t-4 to t), 
and etc. We then construct: 
Mij=
Vi
'Vj
√Vi√Vj
 (1a) 
 
Where Mij is the Jaffe (1986) cosine similarity between firm i’s Vi and firm j’s Vj. Intuitively, a 
higher value of this technological proximity measure indicates a greater technology overlap 
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between firm i and firm j, which in turn suggests that firm i and j’s technological innovations face 
greater technology competition from each other. We then follow Cao et al. (2018) and compute 
TPP by averaging all the Mij that firm i has over j by firm j’s R&D stock G,7 sum up the products, 
scaled by firm i’s own R&D stock, and use the log transformation to calculate the overall 
technological peer pressure firm i faces from other firms in the economy: 
𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡=log(1+ ∑ 𝑀ij𝐺𝑗𝑡
𝑗
/𝐺𝑖𝑡) (1b) 
The numerator 𝑀ij𝐺𝑗𝑡  is the pool of rivals’ R&D stock that represents the threats from rivals’ 
technology advances to firm i. The denominator 𝐺𝑖𝑡 is firm i’s own R&D stock and it represents 
the firm’s technological preparedness (Cao et al. 2018). TPP hence represents the threats of rivals’ 
technology advances relative to the firm’s own preparedness. Using this measure, Cao et al. (2018) 
provide evidence that technology peer pressure incurs proprietary costs and could affect firm 
product disclosures. 
Measuring innovation originality and technology obsolescence 
Following Hirshleifer et al. (2018), we measure innovation originality (Originality) by the 
breadth of knowledge used to innovate. This is motivated by a popular view of innovation as 
recombinant search (e.g., Weitzman 1998; Singh and Fleming 2010). Under this view, innovation 
comes from combining technological components in novel manners or reconfiguring existing 
combinations. We proxy a firm’s Originality by the average range of knowledge built upon by its 
recently granted patents, i.e., the average number of unique technological classes of patents cited 
by its recently granted patents. Intuitively, a patent that draws knowledge from a wide range of 
technology areas is more original because it tends to deviate from current technology trajectories 
                                                          
7 As in Hall et al. (2005) and Bloom et al. (2013), R&D stocks are calculated using a perpetual inventory method with 
a 15 percent depreciation rate. That is, Gt = Rt+(1-ρ) Gt-1, where Rt is the R&D expenditure in year t and ρ = 0.15. 
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to a greater extent (e.g., Balsmeier et al. 2017). Originality may also reflect the capability of a 
firm’s managers and scientists to combine different technologies in an original way.  
We first compute a patent’s originality score as the number of unique technological classes 
(i.e., 438 technology classes by the USPTO) assigned to the patents cited by the focal patent. We 
then proxy a firm’s innovation originality in each year with the average originality score of all 
patents granted to the firm over the previous five years. The choice of a five-year window (i.e., t-
4 to t) for patent-based proxies is due to the five-year technology cycle (e.g., Matolcsy and Wyatt 
2008; Pandit et al. 2011). The formula is expressed as followed: 
          𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =
1
#𝑗
∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−𝑝
4
𝑝=0                                                     (2a) 
Where 𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the number of unique technology classes of all other patents cited by patent j granted 
to firm i in year t, and #j stands for the total number of the patents granted to firm i from year t-4 
to year t (inclusive). 
Following Qiu et al. (2017), we measure a firm’s technology obsolescence (Obsolescence) 
using the growth rate of patent classes of the firm. First, for each patent class i of 438 classes that 
are classified by the USPTO, we calculate its average annual growth rate in the number of patents 
over the previous ten years:8 
?̅?𝑖,𝑡 =
1
10
∑ 𝑔𝑖,𝑡−𝑝
10
𝑝=1
 (2b) 
  
𝑔𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
 (2c) 
                                                          
8 We require observations of at least three years for the calculation of average patent growth in the past. 
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A high growth rate indicates a rising class of technology. Next, we calculate the weight of class 
i’s patents in a firm j’s patent portfolio at time t using patents applied and eventually granted during 
the period t-3 to t-1, 
𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡
 
(2d) 
 
 
Where 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 is the number of class i’s patents granted to firm j during the period t-
3 to t-1; 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡 is the total number of patents granted to firm j during the period 
t-3 to t-1. 
We then create a firm-level measure of technology obsolescence that captures the growth 
trend of a firm’s patent portfolio using the weighted average of the patent’s growth for the firm’s 
patent portfolio: 
  𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡?̅?𝑖,𝑡
𝑖
 (2e) 
 
A lower value of 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑗,𝑡 suggests that firm j has more patents in classes that have 
a low growth rate and, hence, implies that firms experiencing a low technology trend are likely to 
be those that possess obsolete technologies and are incapable of generating new technologies 
through innovation to replace aging ones. We therefore use the negated 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑗,𝑡 as 
our obsolescence measure: 
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = −𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑗,𝑡  (2f) 
 
Measuring product market competition 
Technological competition is related to, but different from, product market competition. 
We control for the effect of product market competition in our analyses. Following Bloom et al. 
(2013), we measure product market competition in a similar fashion as technological competition. 
The product market competition measure takes into account the product market closeness captured 
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by the overlaps between a firm and its rivals’ sales across four-digit SIC industries. We first assign 
each firm with a product market distribution vector Pi based on its sales distribution across four-
digit SIC codes (product market segments). Pi ={p1, p2,…,pn}, where pi is the average sales share 
of firm i in the product market segment 1 during the past five years. We then construct  
    Nij=
𝑃𝑖′𝑃𝑗
√𝑃𝑖√𝑃𝑗
 (3a) 
 
Where Nij is the cosine similarity between Pi and Pj; Intuitively, a higher value of the product market 
proximity measure indicates a greater overlap of firm i’s sales distribution across industries with 
firm j, which in turn suggests that firm i’s and j’s products face greater market competition or 
competition from each other.  
To conduct firm level analysis, we follow Bloom et al. (2013) and weight all Nij that firm 
i has over j by firm j’s sales, sum up the products, and use the log transformation of this sum to 
calculate product market threat to firm i 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖=log( ∑ 𝑁ij𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗
𝑗
)      (3b) 
 
Sample description   
The sample period covers from 2000 to 2010.9 We begin by including all U.S. public firm-
year observations in Audit Analytics with audit metrics such as going-concern opinions available, 
                                                          
9 Our sample period begins at 2000 because the auditing data in Audit Analytics start to be available in 2000. Our 
sample period ends at 2010 due to the availability of the technological competition measure. The calculation of 
technological competition measure requires patent information during the previous five application years (see 
Appendix for variable definition). Our patent database covers all patents granted during 1976 and 2012 (inclusive) 
and on average, it takes two years for the USPTO to approve the application of a patent and grant it to its innovator. 
Because of the two-year lag between patent application and grant, the granted patent database we use is subject to 
truncation bias since it is very likely missing those patents filed for applications before 2012, but granted after 2012. 
See Hall et al. (2001) for more details about truncation bias of the patent database. To mitigate this truncation bias, 
we leave out two years and only use patent information with applications before the end of 2010. 
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and in Compustat with financial accounting data available for the sample period. Our initial sample 
has 48,436 firm year observations. We exclude ADRs, closed-end funds, REITs, firms with 
negative sales, financial and utility firms (i.e., SIC: 4000-4999 and 6000-6999) and firms without 
the necessary data to calculate technological competition variables and control variables in the 
main regression models. Our selection procedure results in a total number of 16,296 firm-year 
observations over the sample period. Following prior research, we restrict our sample to financially 
distressed firms with first-time going-concern opinions during the sample period (e.g., Li 2009; 
DeFond et al. 2002; Chen et al. 2013). We exclude 232 firm-year observations, which do not 
receive going-concern opinions for the first time, and 9,198 firm-year observations which are not 
financially distressed. This procedure leads to 16,064 firm-year observations in the full sample, 
and 6,866 firm-year observations that are financially distressed. Table 1 delineates the sample 
selection in detail. For continuous variables, we either take the logarithm or winsorize the data 
annually at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  
<insert Table 1 around here> 
Table 2 Panel A1 shows the sample distribution over years. We have the most observations 
(i.e., 15.15%) in 2001; since then there is a steady decline of observations every year. In 2010, we 
have the least observations (i.e., 4.62%). Panel A2 provides information on industry distribution 
by SIC codes for the sample (we list the largest 10 industries by 2-digit SIC code). We observe 
that the test sample is concentrated in some sectors. Biotech and pharmaceutical industries have 
the most sample observations (i.e., 26.33%), followed by electrical and electronics (i.e., 17.42%) 
and business services (i.e., 15.61%). Approximately 11.10% of the sample are not in any of the 10 
largest industries.  
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Prior literature (e.g., Lim and Tan 2008; Reichelt and Wang 2010) restricts their going-
concern opinion analyses to financially distressed firms. In addition, Lennox and Pittman (2010) 
indicate negative book equity as companies suffer financial distress. We conduct our analyses in 
both the full sample and the financially distressed sample. We define that a firm is financially 
distressed if it reports negative operating cash flow or negative book equity. Table 2 Panel B shows 
the descriptive statistics of the distressed sample and the full sample. The mean of the issuance of 
going-concern audit opinions (GCOpinion) is 0.076 for the distressed sample and 0.042 for the 
full sample, respectively. On average, the degree of technological peer pressure is 7.154 for the 
distressed sample versus 6.762 for the full sample, and the degree of sales competition is 10.328 
for the distressed sample versus 9.917 for the full sample. Panel C compares firms with clean 
opinions and firms with first-time going-concern opinions. It shows that firms with going-concern 
opinions experience greater technological peer pressure than clean firms and the difference is 
significant, evidenced by the p value being less than 1%.  
Table 2 Panel D presents the correlations among variables in the main regression. We 
observe that there is significantly positive correlation between going-concern audit opinions 
(GCOpinion) and technological peer pressure (TPP), evidenced by the coefficient of 0.087. 
Notably, going-concern audit opinion is also significantly correlated with sales competition 
(SaleComp). We also observe that technological peer pressure is positively correlated with loss 
incidence (Loss), earnings volatility (EarnVol), the absolute value of total accruals (ACCR), and 
negatively correlated with return on assets (ROA), leverage (LEV), and operating cash flows (OCF).  
<insert Table 2 around here> 
 
4. Empirical results  
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          Our empirical investigation in this section helps answer the following question: How does 
an auditor perceive its client’s technological peer pressure when issuing a going-concern opinion? 
We turn to multivariate analysis to examine the relationship between our technological peer 
pressure variable and the probability of the firm receiving a going-concern audit report. Following 
DeFond et al. (2002) and Li (2009), we use a pooled logistic regression to estimate the audit-
opinion model specified as follows: 
Pr(𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1 𝑜𝑟 0)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +
 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                     (4) 
Where the dependent variable, GCOpinion, a dummy of going-concern audit opinion is either 1 or 
0. The main variable of interest is the technological peer pressure (TPP), since we are interested 
in the effect of the technology aspect of peer pressure or competition, but we control for the effect 
of the sales aspect of the product market competition. 
 Following prior studies, we control for other factors that are likely to affect the issuance of 
going-concern opinions. Prior studies document that financially distressed firms are more likely to 
receive going-concern opinions. We control for Altman Z score (AltmanZ) and expect a negative 
coefficient on AltmanZ. A firm reporting a loss (Loss) is more likely to have a going-concern 
problem so we expect a positive coefficient on Loss. On the contrary, a firm reporting large cash 
flow (OCF) and high profitability (ROA) is less likely to have going-concern problems so we 
expect negative coefficients on OCF and ROA. We expect a negative association between going-
concern opinions and firm size (Size), given that auditors perceive larger companies have more 
resources and greater ability to avoid bankruptcy (e.g., Mutchler et al. 1997; Li 2009). We control 
for measures of firm risk, including leverage (LEV) and earnings volatility (EarnVol), and we 
expect a positive relation between firm risk and going-concern opinions. We also control for 
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accounting accruals (ACCR), since prior literature has shown the significant relation between 
accounting accruals and going-concern opinion (e.g., Francis and Krishnan 1999).  
 We further expect positive associations between going-concern opinions and large audit 
firms (BigN), audit specialization (R&DSpec), and audit report lag (AuditLag). Big auditors suffer 
greater reputation loss and litigation risk from failed audits (e.g., Khurana and Raman 2004; Li 
2009) and thus are more likely to issue going-concern opinions. Godfrey and Hamilton (2005) 
present strong evidence that R&D intensity is positively associated with firms’ choices of auditors 
who specialize in auditing R&D contracts. Reichelt and Wang (2010) find that when the auditor 
is both a national and a city-specific industry specialist, its clients are more likely to be issued a 
going-concern opinion. Moreover, prior research finds that going-concern companies are 
associated with longer reporting lags (e.g., McKeown et al. 1991; Mutchler et al. 1997; Li 2009).  
 If auditors believe that there is substantial doubt about the ability of the client to continue 
as a going-concern for a reasonable period of time, auditors should consider management’s plans 
for dealing with the adverse effects of the conditions and events (PCAOB AS 2415). Such 
considerations include plans to borrow money or restructure debt and plans to increase ownership 
equity. Therefore, auditors are less likely to issue going-concern opinions when clients have the 
ability to raise additional debt financing and equity capital. We expect a negative association 
between new issuance for capital (NewCapital) and the propensity of going-concern audit opinions. 
Equation (4) also controls for year and industry fixed effects.  
 The results of estimating equation (4) are reported in Table 3. The model is significant at 
p value < 0.001, with pseudo R2 of 40.2% for the distressed sample and pseudo R2 of 42.3% for 
the full sample. All control variables are significant at p value < 0.10 except for earnings volatility 
(EarnVol), Big-N auditors (BigN) and auditor tenure (Tenure). The results in Table 3 show that a 
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client firm confronting intensified technological peer pressure is more likely to receive a going-
concern audit opinion, evidenced by a significantly positive parameter estimate (β1 = 0.112 with p 
value < 1%) for the distressed sample and (β1 = 0.091 with p value < 5%) for the full sample, 
respectively. The marginal effect of technological peer pressure is estimated as 0.075 (0.066) for 
the distressed (full) sample, which means that one standard deviation in TPP leads to 11.36% 
(12.55%) increase in the likelihood of going-concern opinions. 
Lennox (1999) shows that operating cash flows (CFO) and leverage (LEV) have non-linear 
effects on financial viability. Failure to take account of these non-linearities may cause 
heteroscedasticity problems. In Equation (4), we also include polynomial variables (LEV2, CFO2, 
ROA2, and ROA3). The results, untabulated for simplicity, are qualitatively similar for control 
variables, whilst the coefficients on TPP remain significantly positive. In addition, we run 
subsampling tests 1) after we exclude non-Big N client firms; 2) on the sample from 2004 to 2010, 
given the audit market changes after 2003; 3) by adding an additional control of internal control 
weaknesses,10 and we find that the main results from these additional tests still hold. Overall, our 
findings support the notion that auditors are more likely to issue going-concern reports when the 
client firm’s technological peer pressure is fierce, ceteris paribus. 
<insert Table 3 around here> 
 A type of information that is especially hard to evaluate is the originality of innovation.  
An original technology is competitive. At the same time, the originality involves many dimensions 
of uncertainty that requires extensive knowledge and expertise for auditors to evaluate. We further 
test whether the above observed relation between technological competition and the propensity of 
                                                          
10 Internal control weakness is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm discloses at least one material 
weakness in internal control over financial reporting in the given fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. Internal control 
disclosures under SOX Section 404 became available for the fiscal years ending on November 15, 2004 and beyond. 
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receiving a going-concern audit opinion varies when the client firm has original innovation 
activities. In Equation (4), we add the interaction of technological competition and originality (i.e., 
TPP × Originality), both used as dummy variables; 1 above the sample median by year and 
industry and 0 otherwise, to ease interpretation from multivariate regression.   
 Some firms possess obsolete technologies and are unable to develop new technologies 
through innovation to replace old ones. It is easier for auditors to evaluate a firm’s aging 
technologies. To study whether the association between technological competition and going-
concern audit opinions is related to technological obsolescence and firm’s inability to innovate, in 
Equation (4), we add the interaction of obsolescence and technological competition (i.e., TPP × 
Obsolescence). Both are used as dummy variables; 1 above the sample median by year and industry 
and 0 otherwise, to ease interpretation from multivariate regression. Table 4 reports the results 
with the interaction of TPP × Originality in Column (1) and TPP × Obsolescence in Column (2).  
Table 4 shows that the coefficient on TPP × Originality is significantly positive (0.074 
with p value < 5%), indicating that when the client firm has original technologies, the auditor is 
more likely to issue a going-concern opinion. Our findings suggest that auditors may have 
difficulties in understanding the client’s technological condition, especially when the technologies 
are new and original; Hirshleifer et al. (2018) indicate that innovative originality is stronger for 
firms with higher valuation uncertainty, lower investor attention, and greater sensitivity of future 
profitability to innovative originality.11 
We further find that the coefficients on both Obsolescence and TPP × Obsolescence are 
negative (-0.032 and -0.035, respectively). Opposite to new and original technologies, old-aged 
                                                          
11 Hirshleifer et al. (2018) further point out that the originality measure is constructed based upon patent information 
instead of product information. Therefore, these patents may not generate cash flows for the firm quickly; the road 
from patent being granted to the patent-protected products generating cash flows could take years and is subject to 
technical and market uncertainty. 
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technologies are not significantly related to the propensity of receiving a going-concern audit 
opinion. Taken together, the findings in Table 4 suggest that the above documented positive 
relationship between client’s technological peer pressure and the propensity of receiving a going-
concern audit opinion is not likely caused by obsolete technologies, and instead is caused by new 
and original technologies. 
<insert Table 4 around here> 
When technological peer pressure intensifies, firms demand a large amount of financial 
resources either to engage in innovation activities or to acquire from outside. Thus, a firm’s cash 
holding and its accessibility to external financing is critical for it to survive the competition. 
Financially constrained firms are not able to finance their R&D projects continuously and are more 
likely to suspend their R&D projects, which suggests a higher probability of business failure. Li 
(2011) finds a positive relation between R&D intensity and stock returns only among financially 
constrained firms, which implies that the firm risk induced by R&D investment is driven by 
financial constraints. In addition, financially constrained firms are not able to quickly absorb 
technology spillovers, which decreases the R&D productivity (Qiu and Wan 2015) and potential 
profitability. Thus, financial constraints could worsen the negative effect of technological peer 
pressure on a firm’s profitability, prospects and survival, which leads to higher odds of receiving 
going-concern audit opinions. 
Following Hadlock and Pierce (2010), we use firm size and age to measure financial 
constraints. They confirm that firm size and age are negatively related to financial constraints. 
They also suggest that firm size and age are highly reliable predictors of financial constraints. An 
advantage of using firm size and age to proxy for financial constraints is that they are less likely 
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to be endogenous relative to alternative measures, such as the KZ index.12 Those measures are 
based on major firm policy variables, such as cash holdings, payout, leverage, and investment. 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) show that financial constraint proxies based on firm policies (e.g., 
dividend and liquidity) result in unreliable loadings. They also establish that the only other 
variables that consistently predict constraints, after controlling for size and age, are leverage and 
cash flows.  
We measure firm total assets (TA) as the natural logarithm of inflation adjusted book value 
of assets in 2006 dollars (2006 is the midyear of our sample period). Firm age (Age) is defined as 
the number of years between the observation year and the first year that the firm appears on 
Compustat. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) also note that introducing a non-linear term for size 
improves the explanatory power of proxies for financial constraints. Therefore, we add firm size 
squared (TAsq), in addition to firm size and age, as an alternative set of financial constraint proxies 
in our analyses. We estimate the Hadlock and Pierce Index (HPindex), which is calculated as 
−0.737 × TAt-1 + 0.043 × TAsqt-1 − 0.04 × Aget-1. HPindex is used to measure financial constraints; 
a higher index indicates greater financial constraints.   
Next, we test whether the above documented relationship between technological peer 
pressure and the propensity of receiving a going-concern audit opinion becomes stronger or weaker 
when the client firm experiences financial constraints. In Equation (4), we add the interaction of 
technological peer pressure and HP Index (i.e., TPP × HPindex), where both are dummy variables 
in the regression; 1 above the sample median by year and industry and 0 otherwise, to ease 
interpretation. We also use the level of cash holding (Cash), the cash ratio following Qiu and Wan 
                                                          
12 For interested readers, please refer to Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) for a variety of financial constraint 
measures. 
26 
 
(2015), as another measure of financial constraint or the abundance of financial resources. Cash is 
used as reverse rank dummy, to ease interpretation from multivariate regression. Table 5 reports 
the results with the interaction of TPP × Cash in Column (1) and TPP × HPindex in Column (2).  
Table 5 presents the cross-sectional analysis for financial constraints.  In Column (1) the 
coefficient on TPP × Cash (reverse rank) is the most significant (0.080 with p value < 1%), 
indicating that the positive relation between technological peer pressure and going-concern 
opinions are stronger for the firms with financial constraints. In Column (2), we find that the 
coefficient on TPP × HPindex is the most significant (0.062 with p value < 1%). In conclusion, 
the results suggest that the above documented positive relationship between client’s technological 
peer pressure and the propensity of receiving a going-concern audit opinion is more pronounced 
when the client firm experiences financial constraints or lacks financial resources. 
<insert Table 5 around here> 
An auditor incurs substantial litigation-related costs if it does not issue a going-concern 
opinion for a client that fails later on (e.g., Kaplan and Williams 2013). Auditors are more likely 
to issue going-concern opinions to avoid such cost if they perceive a higher litigation risk. Prior 
studies document a positive relation between litigation risk and the probability of issuing a going- 
concern opinion. Krishnan and Krishnan (1996) model the two stages of auditors’ decision-making 
process and find that auditors’ litigation risk positively affects auditors’ opinion formulation 
process. Geiger et al. (2006) find that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, enacted in 1995, 
reduces the litigation threat against auditors and, therefore, decreases the likelihood of going-
concern reports.  
Studies also find that auditors are more likely to issue going-concern opinions during 
circumstances such as the global financial crisis, a period when clients have higher bankruptcy 
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risk (e.g., Geiger et al. 2014), and in the post-SOX era, a period yielding a more stringent legal 
environment to auditors (e.g., Geiger et al. 2005; Fargher and Jiang 2008). Using a simultaneous 
equation estimation, Kaplan and Williams (2013) find that auditors’ litigation risk ex ante is 
positively associated with going-concern opinions and going-concern reporting is negatively 
associated with auditor litigation and the likelihood of large financial settlements. Their results 
imply that auditors are able to protect themselves from potential litigation risk by issuing going-
concern opinions. Following this line of research, we examine whether an auditor is more 
conservative in going-concern reporting, for its clients confronting intensified technological peer 
pressure, if it perceives a higher litigation risk.  
We use a litigation score estimated from the litigation risk model developed by Kim and 
Skinner (2012). We further test whether the relation between technological competition and going-
concern audit opinions is different for auditor with higher litigation risk. In Equation (4), we add 
the interaction of technological peer pressure and the litigation score (i.e., TPP × Litigation), both 
used as dummy variables; 1 above the sample median by year and industry and 0 otherwise, to 
ease interpretation from multivariate regression.  
Hennes et al. (2008) propose a straightforward procedure for classifying restatements as 
either errors or irregularities and find that most of the restatements classified as irregularities are 
followed by fraud-related class action lawsuits. We include the interaction of a dummy of 
technological peer pressure and a dummy variable of fraudulent reporting, following Hennes et al. 
2008, (i.e., TPP × Fraud). Table 6 reports the results with the interaction of TPP × Litigation in 
Column (1) and TPP × Fraud in Column (2). It shows that, in Table 6 Column (1), the coefficient 
on TPP × Litigation is significantly positive (0.085 with p value < 5%), indicating that when 
auditors expect higher litigation risk, they are more likely to issue going-concern opinions. In 
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Column (2), we find that the coefficients on both Fraud and TPP × Fraud are significantly positive 
(0.061 with p value < 5% and 0.124 with p value < 1%, respectively). In conclusion, the results 
suggest that the positive relation between client technological peer pressure and the propensity of 
receiving a going-concern audit opinion is more pronounced when the client firm experiences 
higher litigation risk and/or misreporting risk. 
<insert Table 6 around here> 
Audit opinion accuracy regression  
To test the hypothesis H2, we examine the effects of technological peer pressure on the 
accuracy of auditors’ going-concern opinions by analyzing Type-I and Type-II errors. 13  We 
estimate the following logistic model: 
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐼 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1,2,3 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑃𝑃 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (5) 
 
The first dependent variable is Type I Error (TypeI), which equals 1 if an auditor issues a 
going-concern opinion to a client who does not subsequently file for bankruptcy in the next fiscal 
year (i.e., t+1), 0 otherwise. For the Type-I error test, the sample includes firms that receive first-
time going-concern opinions, as rendering an initial going-concern opinion to a client is a 
particularly difficult decision for the auditor (Li 2009).14 We have 522 firm observations that 
received first-time going-concern opinions. Another dependent variable is Type II Error (TypeII), 
set to 1 if the bankrupt company did not receive a going-concern opinion in any of the prior three 
                                                          
13 Using bankruptcy outcome as an ex post measure of whether a company should be given a going concern opinion 
is not always a perfect measure of accuracy. For instance, Type-II error can occur when a client firm voluntarily 
liquidates (Geiger and Rama 2006). 
14 If a firm’s bankruptcy is in year t+2 or t+3 after being issued a going-concern opinion at year t, rather than the 
auditor having made a mistake, this may represent an even earlier warning to the market (Carcello and Palmrose 1994). 
We redefine Type I Error for firms not going bankrupt within 3 years after being issued a going-concern opinion and 
find similar test results. 
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years (i.e., t-1 to t-3), 0 otherwise. For the Type-II error test, the sample includes only bankrupt 
companies. We have 202 firms that declare bankruptcy. 
In Equation (5), following Mutchler et al. (1997), DeFond et al. (2002), and Li (2009), we 
control for financial distress factors, which include Altman Z-score (AltmanZ), cash from 
operating activities (OCF), financial leverage (LEV), profitability (ROA), new issuance for capital 
(NewCapital), and operating loss (Loss). Following Geiger and Rama (2006), we add client size 
(Size) and earnings volatility (EarnVol). Following Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) and Li (2009), 
we add the controls for auditor tenure (Tenure), big-N auditor (BigN) and audit report lag 
(AuditLag).  
The results of estimating Equation (5) are reported in Table 7. The coefficient on 
technological peer pressure (TPP) is positive (β1 = 0.076, p value < 5% in the Type-I error test, 
and β1 = 0.041, p value > 10% in Type-II error test, respectively). The results show that 
technological peer pressure increases the likelihood of Type I error in general, implying greater 
auditor conservatism in going-concern reporting. The results on Big N auditors are mixed. 
Specifically, we find less Type I reporting errors for Big N auditors but insignificant results for 
Type II error.  The results are consistent with studies, such as Mutchler et al. (1997) and Geiger et 
al. (2005), which also examine prior audit reports issued to bankrupt companies and conclude there 
is no signiﬁcant big-N effect on the Type-II error rates.  
The control variables, Size, NewCapital, and OCF have the predicted coefficient signs. 
Firm size (Size) has a negative effect on audit report error. Nogler (1995) ﬁnds that smaller 
companies are more likely to resolve their going-concern uncertainties, but larger companies 
receiving going-concern modiﬁcations are more likely to subsequently ﬁle for bankruptcy. Like 
client firm size, the magnitude of operating cash flows (OCF) and the new issuance for capitals 
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(NewCapital) have a significant negative effect on auditor’s opinion error. For the control of 
auditor tenure, our results show that auditor tenure (Tenure) is positively associated with auditor’s 
Type-I error while negatively associated with auditor’s Type-II error. 
<insert Table 7 around here> 
Although Table 7 shows that technological peer pressure increases the likelihood of Type 
I misclassification in general, due to greater auditor conservatism, it is possible that not all the 
auditors respond to clients’ technological competition in the same way. Clients facing fierce 
technological peer pressure demand higher audit quality, i.e., going-concern reporting accuracy, 
and auditor conservatism might be undesirable by these firms. For example, Chy and Hope (2018) 
show that auditor conservatism leads to a reduction of investments in R&D and innovations. In 
addition, auditors might have anticipated the increased cost associated with going-concern 
reporting errors for clients with greater technological competition. Thus, auditors might exert more 
effort, e.g., allocating more resources, expanding audit scope, increasing sampling and testing, to 
increase reporting accuracy. 
 Table 8 shows that how audit effort affects the relation between technological competition 
and reporting accuracy of going-concern opinions. Prior studies show that abnormal audit fees 
reflect audit effort (e.g., Blankley et al. 2012; Doogar et al. 2015). We follow these studies and 
measure audit effort as the residual value estimated from an audit fee model. Specifically, ABFEE 
is an indicator variable, 1 if the abnormal audit fee estimated following Blankley et al. (2012) is 
positive, and 0 otherwise. Consistent with Table 7, TPP positively affects the likelihood of Type I 
misclassification, implying more conservative audit reporting. The coefficient on the interaction 
between TPP and ABFEE is negative and significant in both Type I and Type II regressions (-0.056 
and -0.046, respectively, p value < 5%). More importantly, F-tests show that the coefficient on 
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TPP + TPP × ABFEE is negative and significant, suggesting that auditors who exert more effort 
improve audit quality for clients facing fierce technological peer pressure by reducing both Type 
I and Type II misclassifications.    
<insert Table 8 around here> 
Technological competition and auditor specialization  
One reason for high error rates of going-concern opinions, especially Type II 
misclassification, is that auditors fail to include specialized knowledge and expertise (Arnold et al. 
2001; Carson et al. 2013). Firms facing fierce technological peer pressure and competition may 
hold large amounts of intangible assets and R&D capitals. Godfrey and Hamilton (2005) predict 
and find a positive association between R&D intensity and specialist auditor choice in auditing 
R&D-intensive clients. Prior studies on auditor judgement show that when the engagement risk is 
higher, auditors are motivated to elaborate on specialists’ work (Griffith 2018). When clients face 
intensified technological peer pressure, auditors’ perceived business risk (and engagement risk) is 
higher and auditors are more concerned with reporting accuracy of going-concern opinions. Thus, 
they are more likely to apply specialized knowledge of experts.  
Table 9 reports the effect of a client’s technological peer pressure on its auditor’s R&D 
specialization. Following Godfrey and Hamilton (2005), we measure an auditor’s R&D 
specialization as the percentage of all audit clients’ R&D expense applicable to clients of the 
auditor of a firm. The results show a positive and significant association between a client’s 
technological peer pressure and its auditor’s R&D specialization (coefficient is 0.005 and 0.006, 
for the distressed sample and the full sample, respectively), indicating that clients facing intensified 
technological peer pressure are more likely to use auditors specialized in auditing R&D – the 
impact of technological peer pressure on demand for specialized auditor services.   
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<insert Table 9 around here> 
 
5. Conclusions  
The auditing standards require auditors to understand the competitive environment when 
they assess a client firm’s going-concern problem, however, the effect of a client firm’s 
competition on auditors’ going-concern reporting is not explored in prior literature. In this study, 
we focus on the technological aspect of competition, technological peer pressure, as technologies 
become the main driver of a firm’s economic value in the long term and are critical to a firm’s 
viability. 
We find that a client’s technological peer pressure positively affects the likelihood of 
receiving a going-concern opinion, consistent with the notion that the perceived auditor business 
risk increases with intensified technological peer pressure so that auditors are more likely to issue 
going-concern opinions for such clients. Further evidence shows that this positive effect is more 
pronounced for client firms with original technologies, firms who are financially constrained, and 
for auditors facing higher litigation risk. We also find that technological peer pressure decreases 
both Type I and Type II reporting errors for auditors exerting more effort, suggesting that auditors 
exert more effort to increase audit quality in response to clients’ technological peer pressure, 
instead of simply being conservative. Our study provides direct evidence on how auditors perceive 
and respond to the higher business risk from clients’ technological peer pressure. Since auditors 
have access to clients’ private information and have a real impact on clients’ operations, their 
perceptions and responses to client firms’ competitive environment are relevant and insightful.   
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
GCOpinion = 
An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms receiving a first-time 
going-concern audit opinion, 0 otherwise. 
TypeI = 
An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms receiving going-concern 
opinion and not going bankrupt in the following year, 0 otherwise. 
TypeII = 
An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms not receiving going-
concern opinion and going bankrupt in any prior three years, 0 
otherwise. 
R&DSpec = 
Auditor specialization, as the percentage of all audit clients’ R&D 
expense applicable to clients of the auditor of a firm, following 
Godfrey and Hamilton (2005). 
TPP = 
The measure of technological peer pressure following Cao et al. 
(2018). See Section 3 for the detail of calculating the measure.  
SaleComp = 
The measure of competitive threats from product market rivals 
following Bloom et al. (2013). See Section 3 for the detail of 
calculating the measure.  
AltmanZ = Altman’s (1983) default score. 
Loss = 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s income before 
extraordinary items or operating cash flow is negative; 0 
otherwise. 
Size = The natural logarithm of market value of equity (csho × prcc_f). 
ROA = 
Return on assets, defined as income before extraordinary items (ib) 
scaled by total assets (at). 
ROAL  = Lagged ROA  
ACCR = 
Absolute value of total accruals (ib – oancf + xidoc) scaled by total 
assets. 
LEV = 
Financial leverage, calculated as total debt (dltt + dlc) scaled by 
total assets. 
OCF = Operating cash flow (oancf – xidoc) scaled by total assets. 
EarnVol = The standard deviation of ROA in previous five years. 
BigN = 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is among big 
N auditors, where N = 5 before the end of year 2002 and N = 4 
after 2002. 
Tenure = 
The duration of the auditor-client relationship in years after 
reconciling Compustat and AuditAnalytics databases. We use it as 
the logged value. 
NewCapital 
  
= 
An indicator variable equal to 1 when the client firm issued equity 
(sstk) or long-term debt (dltt) during the year that is greater than 
5% of total assets, 0 otherwise. 
AuditLag = 
The logged value of the number of calendar days from fiscal year-
end to the date of the auditor’s report (i.e., auditor’s signature 
date). 
R&D = The logged value of R&D intensity (R&D scaled by sales). 
OPCYCLE = 
Length of operating cycle in days, measured as days to sell 
inventory plus average collection period; days to sell is the average 
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of the most current two years of total inventories divided by the 
sum of cost of goods sold divided by 360; average collection 
period is average of the most recent two years of total receivables 
divided by the sum of net sales divided by 360. 
CAPINT = 
Capital intensity, measured as gross property plant and equipment 
scaled by sales. 
Originality  = 
A measure of innovation originality by the breadth of knowledge 
used to innovate, following Hirshleifer et al. (2018). 
Obsolescence = 
A measure of technical obsolescence or negative technology trend 
following Qiu et al. (2017). 
Cash = 
Cash ratio, measured as cash-to-assets and marketable securities 
divided by total book assets. We also use the logarithm of cash-to-
assets ratio in our robustness checks, following Qiu and Wan 
(2015). 
HPindex = 
Following Hadlock and Pierce (2010), we use firm size and age to 
measure financial constraints. 
Litigation = 
Litigation score estimated using the litigation risk model 
developed by Kim and Skinner (2012). 
Fraud = 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm was required to restate 
their accounting numbers due to irregularity in previous two years; 
0 otherwise. We classify using the restatement data developed by 
Hennes et al. (2008) to identify firms with financial reporting 
fraud. 
ABFEE = 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the abnormal audit fee estimated 
following Blankley et al. (2012) is positive, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 1: Sample selection procedures  
The total number of U.S. public firm-year observations in AuditAnalytics with 
going-concern data available and in Compustat with financial accounting data 
available for the sample period 2000-2010 (inclusive) 
48,436 
 
Less: firm-year observations without patent data available to calculate 
technological peer pressure measure 
(27,740) 
 
Less: financial and utility company observations (SIC: 6000-6999 and 
4000-4999) 
(1,012) 
 Less: firm-year observations with missing data in control variables (3,388) 
The total number of firm-year observations with going-concern opinions 16,296 
 
Less: firm-year observations where the going-concern issuance is not 
the first time over the sample period 
(232) 
The total number of firm-year observations in the full sample 16,064 
 
Less: firm-year observations with positive book equity and positive 
operation cash flow 
(9,198) 
The total number of firm-year observations in the financially distressed sample 6,866 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A1: Sample distribution across years 
Year # of firm-years Percent 
2000 658 9.58% 
2001 1,040 15.15% 
2002 902 13.14% 
2003 763 11.11% 
2004 655 9.54% 
2005 572 8.33% 
2006 533 7.76% 
2007 460 6.70% 
2008 492 7.17% 
2009 474 6.90% 
2010 317 4.62% 
Total 6,866 100% 
 
 
 
Panel A2: Sample distribution across in the top 10 industries with more samples  
Two-digit SIC Industries # of firm-years Percent 
28 Biotech and Pharmaceuticals  1,808 26.33% 
36 Electrical and Electronics  1,196 17.42% 
73 Business Services 1,072 15.61% 
38 Medical and Scientific Instruments 936 13.63% 
35 Computers and Machinery 654 9.53% 
87 Engineering & Management Services 142 2.07% 
48 Communications 120 1.75% 
37 Transportation Equipment 77 1.12% 
33 Primary Metal Products 51 0.74% 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 48 0.70% 
Others Others 762 11.10% 
Total  6,866 100% 
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Table 2 <continued>  
Panel B: Summary Statistics 
B1: Distressed sample 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
GCOpinion 6,866 0.076 0.258 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TPP 6,866 7.154 1.508 6.280 7.212 8.042 
SaleComp 6,866 10.328 1.745 9.589 10.702 11.537 
AltmanZ 6,866 5.073 2.021 4.345 4.964 6.589 
Loss 6,866 0.918 0.252 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Size 6,866 5.228 1.627 4.151 5.203 6.195 
ROA 6,866 -0.306 0.370 -0.422 -0.183 -0.051 
ROAL 6,866 -0.295 0.383 -0.409 -0.172 -0.040 
ACCR 6,866 0.095 0.094 0.030 0.065 0.124 
LEV 6,866 0.433 0.314 0.190 0.359 0.599 
OCF 6,866 -0.138 0.262 -0.235 -0.051 0.030 
EarnVol 6,866 0.435 0.736 0.096 0.185 0.412 
BigN 6,866 0.880 0.322 1.000 1.000 1.000 
R&DSpec 6,866 0.122 0.070 0.007 0.136 0.188 
Cash 6,866 0.243 0.214 0.076 0.180 0.350 
Tenure 6,866 2.350 0.663 1.946 2.303 2.773 
Litigation 6,866 0.067 0.080 0.008 0.023 0.069 
Fraud 4,810 0.018 0.132 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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B2: Full sample 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
GCOpinion 16,064 0.042 0.140 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TPP 16,064 6.762 1.895 5.606 6.794 7.839 
SaleComp 16,064 9.917 1.972 8.973 10.339 11.442 
Size 16,064 6.236 2.024 4.828 6.102 7.511 
AltmanZ 16,064 5.026 5.499 4.500 5.017 6.414 
Loss 16,064 0.435 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ROA 16,064 -0.036 0.241 -0.112 0.023 0.080 
CROAL 16,064 -0.027 0.248 -0.102 0.031 0.086 
ACCR 16,064 0.028 0.293 -0.053 0.003 0.059 
LEV 16,064 0.435 0.272 0.218 0.401 0.594 
OCF 16,064 -0.011 0.241 -0.051 0.065 0.122 
Tenure 16,064 2.061 1.116 1.386 2.079 2.773 
EarnVol 16,064 0.075 0.138 0.044 0.068 0.082 
BigN 16,064 0.876 0.292 1.000 1.000 1.000 
R&DSpec 16,064 0.123 0.075 0.008 0.135 0.187 
Cash 16,064 0.185 0.181 0.050 0.123 0.261 
Litigation 16,064 0.053 0.077 0.005 0.016 0.056 
Fraud 9,022 0.023 0.128 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 2 <continued>  
Panel C: Summary statistics by audit opinion 
Variable 
Clean Firms 
(N = 6,344) 
Going-concern firms 
(N = 522) 
P values of the difference 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
TPP 7.012 7.144 8.880 8.352 <0.001 <0.001 
SaleComp 10.019 10.289 10.887 10.583 <0.001 0.004 
AltmanZ 5.019 4.585 5.729 4.982 <0.001 <0.001 
Loss 0.916 1.000 0.942 1.000 <0.001 1.000 
Size 5.308 5.029 4.256 3.552 <0.001 <0.001 
ROA -0.288 -0.152 -0.525 -0.455 <0.001 <0.001 
ROAL -0.289 -0.168 -0.368 -0.196 <0.001 <0.001 
ACCR 0.091 0.064 0.144 0.121 <0.001 <0.001 
LEV 0.431 0.369 0.457 0.584 <0.001 <0.001 
OCF -0.125 -0.045 -0.296 -0.403 <0.001 <0.001 
EarnVol 0.433 0.179 0.459 0.252 <0.001 <0.001 
BigN 0.88 1.000 0.880 1.000 <0.001 1.000 
Tenure 2.316 1.946 2.763 1.792 <0.001 <0.001 
Cash 0.245 0.182 0.219 0.176 <0.001 <0.001 
Fraud 0.017 0.000 0.030 0.000 <0.001 1.000 
Litigation 0.065 0.049 0.078 0.074 <0.001 <0.001 
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Table 2 <continued>  
Panel D: Pearson correlation of key variables based on distressed sample (N = 6,866) 
 GCOpinion TPP SaleComp AltmanZ Loss Size ROA ROAL ACCR LEV OCF EarnVol BigN 
TPP 0.087             
SaleComp 0.021 0.055            
AltmanZ -0.071 0.025 0.063           
Loss 0.193 0.201 0.093 -0.024          
Size -0.217 -0.178 -0.154 -0.036 -0.073         
ROA -0.300 -0.194 -0.176 -0.048 -0.266 0.393        
ROAL -0.216 -0.118 -0.109 -0.016 -0.152 -0.216 0.603       
ACCR 0.216 0.112 -0.024 0.092 -0.007 -0.150 -0.154 -0.106      
LEV 0.158 -0.186 -0.124 -0.337 0.013 0.221 -0.031 0.155 -0.146     
OCF -0.375 -0.200 -0.197 -0.013 -0.089 0.528 0.638 0.413 -0.176 -0.086    
EarnVol 0.113 0.156 0.075 0.109 0.065 -0.197 -0.333 -0.112 0.090 -0.054 -0.263   
BigN -0.067 -0.199 0.046 0.047 0.024 0.243 0.019 0.127 -0.050 0.011 0.036 -0.016  
Tenure -0.060 -0.291 0.017 0.073 -0.031 0.250 0.147 0.132 -0.077 0.087 0.097 -0.182 0.268 
This table presents descriptive statistics of variables. Panel A reports the sample distribution across years (Panel A1) and industries (Panel A2). Panel B reports 
summary statistics of variables for the distressed sample (Panel B1) and the full sample (Panel B2). Panel C compares firm characteristics between firms that 
receive going-concern opinions and firms that do not. There are 6,344 firm-years in the clean opinion subsample and 522 firm-years in the first-time going-concern 
opinion subsample. For the variable Fraud, there are 4,468 firm-years in the clean opinion subsample and 342 firm-years in the first-time going-concern opinion 
subsample. Panel D shows the Pearson correlations of key variables based on the distressed sample. The correlation coefficients in bold are significant at the 5% 
level. All variables (except the dummy or logged variables) are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles each year. Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 3: Technological competition and going-concern audit opinion 
 Dependent variable = GCOpinion 
Predicted sign Distressed sample  Full sample  
TPP + 0.112*** 0.091** 
  (2.69) (2.11) 
SaleComp + 0.016* 0.023* 
  (1.71) (1.92) 
AltmanZ - -0.027** -0.021** 
  (-2.24) (-2.34) 
Loss + 0.344*** 0.214*** 
  (5.16) (3.94) 
Size - -0.796*** -0.789*** 
  (-8.46) (-8.30) 
ROA - -0.647*** -0.612*** 
  (-3.06) (-2.81) 
ROAL - -0.231** -0.216** 
  (2.35) (2.08) 
ACCR + 2.209*** 2.259*** 
  (4.12) (4.28) 
LEV + 1.384*** 1.547*** 
  (8.28) (9.55) 
OCF - -2.426*** -2.363*** 
  (-10.16) (-10.01) 
EarnVol + 0.038 0.010 
  (1.08) (0.65) 
BigN + 0.102 0.140 
  (1.22) (1.42) 
Tenure - -0.023 -0.001 
  (-0.55) (-0.02) 
NewCapital  - -0.092** -0.070* 
  (-2.03) (-1.81) 
AuditLag + 0.081* 0.049** 
  (1.70) (2.45) 
R&DSpec + 0.067** 0.069*** 
  (2.30) (4.01) 
Industry & Year FE  Yes Yes 
N  6,866 16,064 
Pseudo R2  0.402 0.423 
This table presents logistic regression results examining the association between firm-level technological competition 
and the prosperity of receiving a going-concern audit opinion. The dependent variable is a dummy of going-concern 
audit opinion. The explanatory variable of interest is technological competition. Estimates on industry & year 
indicators are not reported for brevity. Significance is based on two-way clustered standard errors to account for time-
series (2-digit SIC industry group) and cross-sectional (year) dependence. Refer to the Appendix for variable 
definitions.  
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Table 4: Technological competition and going-concern audit opinion – Technological 
originality or obsolescence  
 Dependent variable = GCOpinion 
Model (1) Model (2) 
TPP 0.066** 0.064** 
 (2.18) (2.15) 
Originality 0.034  
 (1.55)  
TPP × Originality  0.074**  
 (2.52)  
Obsolescence  -0.032 
  (-1.56) 
TPP × Obsolescence  -0.035* 
  (-1.87) 
Controls  Included  Included  
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes 
N 6,866 6,866 
Pseudo R2 0.403 0.403 
This table presents logistic regression results examining the association between firm-level technological competition 
and the prosperity of receiving a going-concern audit opinion when the client firm has original technology or obsolete 
technology. The dependent variable is a dummy of going-concern audit opinion. The explanatory variable of interest 
is technological competition. Estimates on industry & year indicators are not reported for brevity. Significance is 
based on two-way clustered standard errors to account for time-series (2-digit SIC industry group) and cross-sectional 
(year) dependence. Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions.  
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Table 5: Technological competition and going-concern audit opinion – Financial 
constraints 
 Dependent variable = GCOpinion 
Model (1) Model (2) 
TPP 0.062** 0.061** 
 (2.10) (2.08) 
Cash (reverse rank) 0.034*  
 (1.83)  
TPP × Cash (reverse rank) 0.080***  
 (3.12)  
HPindex  0.036** 
  (1.98) 
TPP × HPindex  0.062*** 
  (2.67) 
Controls  Included  Included  
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes 
N 6,866 6,866 
Pseudo R2 0.403 0.402 
This table presents logistic regression results examining the association between firm-level technological competition 
and the prosperity of receiving a going-concern audit opinion when the client firm has financial constraints. The 
dependent variable is a dummy of going-concern audit opinion. The explanatory variable of interest is technological 
competition. Estimates on industry & year indicators are not reported for brevity. Significance is based on two-way 
clustered standard errors to account for time-series (2-digit SIC industry group) and cross-sectional (year) dependence. 
Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions.  
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Table 6: Technological competition and going-concern audit opinion – Litigation risk 
 Dependent variable = GCOpinion 
Model (1) Model (2) 
TPP 0.062** 0.063** 
 (2.10) (2.11) 
Litigation 0.025  
 (0.95)  
TPP × Litigation 0.085**  
 (2.56)  
Fraud  0.061** 
  (2.13) 
TPP × Fraud  0.124*** 
  (3.16) 
Controls  Included  Included  
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes 
N 6,866 4,810 
Pseudo R2 0.403 0.403 
This table presents logistic regression results examining the association between firm-level technological competition 
and the prosperity of receiving a going-concern audit opinion when the auditor faces more audit risk (i.e., misreporting 
or litigation risk). The dependent variable is a dummy of going-concern audit opinion. The explanatory variable of 
interest is technological competition. Estimates on industry & year indicators are not reported for brevity. Significance 
is based on two-way clustered standard errors to account for time-series (2-digit SIC industry group) and cross-
sectional (year) dependence. Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions.  
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Table 7: Technological competition and going-concern opinion accuracy 
 Dependent variable = TypeI Dependent variable = TypeII 
TPP 0.076** 0.041 
 (2.29) (1.53) 
SaleComp 0.023 0.020 
 (1.51) (1.44) 
AltmanZ -0.057* -0.016 
 (-1.66) (-1.56) 
Loss -0.310** -0.201 
 (-2.04) (-1.36) 
Size -0.283* -0.288*** 
 (-1.68) (-3.81) 
ROA 0.533** 0.403* 
 (2.12) (1.68) 
NewCapital  -0.200 -0.130* 
 (-1.55) (-1.80) 
LEV -0.736*** -0.303** 
 (-2.79) (-2.41) 
OCF -0.961* -0.126 
 (-1.78) (-1.50) 
EarnVol 0.055 0.399 
 (0.36) (1.41) 
BigN -0.981** 0.152 
 (-2.00) (0.31) 
AuditLag 0.037 0.016 
 (1.12) (0.55) 
Tenure 0.050* -0.073* 
 (1.67) (-1.70) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
N 6,664 202 
Pseudo R2 0.272 0.190 
This table presents the regression examining the association between firm-level technological competition and the 
opinion accuracy. TypeI equals 1 if an auditor issues a going-concern opinion to a client that does not subsequently 
file for bankruptcy in the next fiscal year, 0 otherwise. TypeII equals 1 if an auditor fails to issue a going-concern 
opinion to a client that subsequently declares bankruptcy, 0 otherwise. The sample of Type II misclassification is 
restricted to firms that go bankrupt. The explanatory variable of interest is technological competition. Coefficient p 
value is two-tailed and based on Wald Chi-squares robust to heteroscedasticity and time-series correlation following 
the methodology in Rogers (1993). Estimates on year indicators are not reported for brevity. Refer to Appendix for 
variable definitions. 
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Table 8: Technological competition and going-concern opinion accuracy – Audit effort  
  Dependent variable = TypeI Dependent variable = TypeII 
TPP 0.048* 0.032 
 (1.93) (1.27) 
ABFEE -0.009 -0.011 
 (-0.55) (-0.58) 
TPP × ABFEE -0.056*** -0.046** 
 (-2.65) (-2.39) 
Controls Included Included 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes 
N 6,664 202 
Pseudo R2 0.272 0.191 
Coefficient of (TPP + TPP × ABFEE) -0.008*** -0.014** 
F Statistics  8.85 4.38 
This table reports the results on how audit effort affects the relation between technological competition and going- 
concern reporting accuracy. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that indicates type I error of reporting a 
going-concern opinion (column 1) or a dummy variable that indicates type II error of reporting a going-concern 
opinion (column 2). Abnormal audit fees (ABFEE) is used to proxy for audit effort. Logistic regression estimated 
method is applied to the models in both Panel A and B. Significance is based on two-way clustered standard errors to 
account for time-series (within the same 2-digit SIC industry group) and cross-sectional (within the same year) 
dependence. Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions.  
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Table 9: Technological competition and auditor R&D specialization 
 Dependent variable = R&DSpec 
Distressed sample Full sample   
TPP 0.005** 0.006** 
 (2.30) (2.55) 
SaleComp -0.002* -0.001 
 (-1.81) (-1.30) 
R&D 0.009*** 0.007*** 
 (2.98) (3.43) 
OPCYCLE 0.001 0.001 
 (0.53) (0.66) 
CAPINT 0.003** 0.002* 
 (2.02) (1.96) 
Loss 0.005 0.004 
 (1.21) (1.02) 
Size 0.015*** 0.021*** 
 (6.64) (8.50) 
ROA 0.177 0.154 
 (1.18) (0.94) 
LEV 0.044** 0.100*** 
 (2.14) (3.39) 
EarnVol 0.033 0.019 
 (0.56) (0.35) 
NewCapital 0.002 0.003 
 (0.56) (0.81) 
Tenure 0.004*** 0.010*** 
 (3.51) (3.94) 
Industry/Year FE Yes Yes 
N 6,866 16,064 
Adj. R2 0.114 0.131 
This table reports the results on the relationship between technological competition and auditor R&D specialization. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Estimates on industry & year indicators are not reported for 
brevity. Significance is based on two-way clustered standard errors to account for time-series (2-digit SIC industry 
group) and cross-sectional (year) dependence. Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
